New Delhi, Sept. 20 -- In the wake of the recent Defence Pact signed between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, speculation is rife in Bangladesh over whether it will opt to formally align with these three countries in what is generally perceived to be an Islamic NATO, with Islam as the common religion.
Rahman's State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Humayun Kabir, told the media recently that the government held a "very positive" view of the Makkah pact, explicitly linking it to Bangladesh's plans to strengthen ties with "Muslim-majority nations." The briefing marked the first time a sitting Bangladeshi official had formally evinced interest in joining the Makkah alliance. However, if Bangladesh were to align formally with these three countries, its diplomatic, security and economic relationship with India would undergo a fundamental structural shift. Such a realignment could naturally prompt accelerated thinking in New Delhi over the prospect of strategic encirclement, particularly as Rahman simultaneously pivots towards China. During a June visit to Beijing, he had called China Bangladesh's "most valued and trusted partner."
According to fresh inputs emanating from Bangladesh, the trilateral Makkah Defence Pact has set off an intense debate in Bangladesh-and, predictably, across the border. Speculation over whether Bangladesh should eventually join this security alliance has spilt into Parliament, social media and foreign-policy circles across the political spectrum. According to Dr Anas Ansar, who is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at North South University (NSU), Bangladesh, and a senior researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, University of Freiburg, Germany, Bangladesh does not appear to have a comprehensive National Security Strategy that clearly identifies the country's principal security threats, establishes priorities, defines the roles of different state institutions and explains how different traditional and non-traditional security apparatuses should work together.
The researcher further argues that those advocating Bangladesh's participation in the Makkah Pact have yet to adequately explain what concrete security problem the arrangement would solve for Bangladesh. Who are the potential adversaries? What obligations would membership create? What would Bangladesh contribute, and what would it receive in return? Most importantly, how would membership fit into a broader national security strategy? But opponents of participation are not necessarily asking the right questions either. Their principal argument often rests on Bangladesh's longstanding preference for strategic autonomy, non-alignment and balanced relations with major powers.
The deeper problem seems to be that Bangladesh is debating a possible alliance without first having a serious national conversation about its own security doctrine. What are Bangladesh's principal security threats and strategic objectives? What are its red lines? Which partnerships strengthen its capabilities, and which risk creating new dependencies? How should diplomacy, intelligence, economic resilience and military power work together to advance the national interest?
According to Ambassador (Retired) Tariq Karim, a former diplomat who was also High Commissioner of Bangladesh to India and is currently Adviser to the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences and the Bay of Bengal Studies Centre at Independent University, Bangladesh, the Makkah agreement raises an immediate question: why was a new pact necessary when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia already have a longstanding defence relationship? The three partners bring different strengths and vulnerabilities. Saudi Arabia is the wealthiest of the three and can finance defence and strategic investment. Yet its oil-dependent economy and energy infrastructure remain exposed, and its armed forces are relatively small. Turkiye, by contrast, has one of NATO's largest standing armies and an advanced defence-industrial base. But NATO membership may not protect it in a confrontation involving Israel. Ankara, therefore, has reason to seek additional deterrence outside the traditional alliance structure. If Iran emerges as the region's major power, Bangladesh will need constructive ties with Tehran. If Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan shape a parallel security bloc, Bangladesh will also need working relations with them. For Bangladesh, the lesson is cautionary, as per Tariq Karim, with the regional picture continuing to be kaleidoscopically fluid and its final shape still highly unpredictable.
Bangladesh's best option is to keep all doors open, maintain good bilateral relations with all sides, and avoid any arrangement that could place Bangladesh on the wrong side of history. Such a mistake would be strategically costly and would worsen socio-economic pressures at home. Bangladesh's safest course is strategic autonomy and active neutrality: not joining either side when partners are in conflict, while continuing to engage constructively with all to safeguard its own national interest. Bangladesh has signalled that it is open to joining the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, as Dhaka seeks to expand its strategic partnerships.
Also, separately and collectively, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye continue to send overtures to Bangladesh to join the pact, ostensibly to strengthen their fraternity. India, on its part, is watching the pros and cons for its eastern neighbour, Bangladesh, if it joins the pact at all. Whatever the case, strategists feel that it is not going to affect India's security interests because of India's already robust ties with the Islamic world in general. In this light, Bangladesh, at best, will only have a psychological advantage if it joins the pact.
Views expressed are personal. The writer is a retired IPS officer, Adviser NatStrat
Published by HT Digital Content Services with permission from Millennium Post.