India, Sept. 19 -- Over the past five years, military juntas of the Sahel - a biogeographical region of Africa that has acquired a political character - have pursued sovereigntist security politics (the framing used to justify their break from Western partnerships). Since 2020, juntas have seized powerin Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (The Alliance of Sahel States), each arguing that expelling Western forces and turning to Moscow would achieve what a decade of French-led counterterrorism had not. By most metrics, thisexperiment has failed. The Sahel exhibits a level of insecurity unmatched since jihadist insurgency proliferated after the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya and the 2012 Mali War. The sovereignty-for-security trade offered to Sahelian populations has not delivered, and the international response has remained too incoherent to fill the resulting vacuum. The juntas' logic was straightforward: If the deficiency lies in foreign tutelage rather than operational execution, security should improve once that tutelage is removed. Instead, the insurgency, driven principally by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has grown in scale, reach and sophistication under juntas that had inherited full sovereign control. Burkina Faso's government controls only around 40% of its own territory; central Mali remains under sustained JNIM pressure, including periodic blockades of Bamako; and Niger's Tillaberi remains among the region's most dangerous territory. Russian forces are present in greater numbers than ever, but this has not translated into protection. That said, this is no longer a Sahelian crisis. The geographic redefinition of the conflict is important. JNIM's expansion is no longer confined to the traditional Sahelian battlespace of the AES; the group has continued to expand southward into northern Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. These States are no longer insulated by geography or relatively stronger institutions. This southern movement is deliberate - JNIM is openingnew fronts and revenue streams in territory with weaker securityinfrastructure, exploiting local grievances. This is a West Africa problem now, and the coastal States arefrontline actors, not bystanders. The US' 2026 counterterrorism strategy has pivoted away fromlarge-footprint intervention towards intelligence-sharing and capacity-building with partners such as Nigeria and AES States. This shift, alongside France's retreat and Russia's mixed record, has opened space for other external actors to define constructive Sahel-adjacent security partnerships. India has spent recent years deepening security andmaritime cooperation across Africa, largelyon a capacity-building and training-oriented model. Nearly 5,000 Indian personnel remain deployed as UN peacekeepers acrossAfrica. Many West African States, including Mali, Togo, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are beneficiaries of Indian Technical andEconomic Cooperation (ITEC) trainingprogrammes, through which security cooperation could be expanded. The sovereignty bargain sold to Sahelian populations following the successive coups between 2020 and 2023 has not delivered the security it promised. The insurgency today is larger in scale, more entrenched territorially, and has expanded its geographic reach than when the juntas assumed power. Only time will tell whether West Africa's security architecture is being permanently reshaped, or whether this is merely a temporary rupture....