India, April 19 -- It has become fashionable to criticise the US for its recent conduct toward Iran. This is not an attempt to defend or rationalise the US's actions. Rather, it seeks to inject perspective into an increasingly ahistorical debate. What is often missing is institutional memory: An understanding of how the present international order was constructed and the conditions under which it emerged. The "rules-based order" was forged in the aftermath of two catastrophic wars. Earlier efforts had faltered. Woodrow Wilson's proposal for a League of Nations after World War I was rejected by the US Senate. Yet, it introduced a lasting premise: International order could be consciously designed, not left solely to shifting power balances. That premise returned after World War II. The Dumbarton Oaks process laid the groundwork for the UN, while Bretton Woods established the global financial architecture. These frameworks shaped modern norms of security, finance, trade, and governance. The US played the central role in this design, providing leadership even as it engaged selectively - remaining outside certain frameworks while shaping others. This underscored a central reality: Power and principle have always coexisted uneasily within it. This order must be understood against the destruction that preceded it. Industrial warfare, aerial bombardment, and weapons capable of unprecedented devastation reshaped both the ethics and limits of conflict. The post-war system emerged from this trauma, anchored in a fragile consensus of "never again", even as authority remained concentrated among five powers. The rise of China, the re-emergence of India, and the growing assertiveness of Russia and regional powers are reshaping the global balance. Technological disruption and renewed competition over energy and resources are transforming the nature of power. In this environment, some American strategists argue that the US risks strategic drift. Iran, in this view, becomes more than a regional issue; it serves as a platform for signalling resolve - not only to Tehran, but to Beijing and beyond. Actions taken in one theatre are intended to shape perceptions of credibility across multiple fronts. Recent actions suggest that while the US retains unmatched military reach, it has exercised a level of restraint. The avoidance of escalation into the most extreme forms of warfare indicates that certain thresholds in great-power conflict remain intact. If current trends persist - where power increasingly substitutes for principle - this won't remain a uniquely American dilemma. Other major powers may face similar choices. As capabilities expand, the temptation to act outside established norms may grow. What begins as a context-specific deviation can harden into accepted practice. This is the paradox of great power transition: What begins as an exception risks becoming a precedent. The question now is whether existing systems are capable of renewal. Ad hoc frameworks may stabilise the present, but risk orphaning the future. Without a broader framework, they risk managing disorder rather than designing order. The Dumbarton Oaks process was a structured diplomatic effort shaped by competing visions and compromise. A contemporary equivalent would be more complex, reflecting a more diffuse distribution of power and lower levels of trust. Such an effort must include the US, China, India, the EU, Russia, and other key powers. India could serve as a credible convenor capable of bridging divides. Its position - engaged with multiple powers yet not formally aligned - gives it a degree of convening legitimacy. Nalanda - the world's first university - offers an appropriate symbolic setting for such dialogue, evoking knowledge exchange across civilisations rather than competition among them....