India, Nov. 10 -- India's judicial backlog has long beennarrated through numbers - more thanfive crore pending cases, including nearly 95,000 before the Supreme Court alone. Even as the top court recorded a sharp reduction in pendency in August 2026, the numbers rose again in September. Across the system, new filings continue to offset or exceed disposals. The system is running faster, yet falling further behind. That paradox is structural. Recent judicial interventions have grown sharper. In May 2026, the apex court, in Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, issued binding directions requiring high courts to endeavour to pronounce reserved judgments within three months, with more promptness in matters involving personal liberty. More recently, Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant, in a speech at the Kerala High Court, called for greater judicial responsiveness,transparent case listings and better identification of urgent matters. His observation that constitutional justice does not begin and end in New Delhi, and that high courts are better placed to address citizens' everydayproblems, is particularly significant. This builds on the long-recognised principle, articulated in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar and reiterated in Hussain v. Union of India, that speedy trial is integral to Article 21. The conventional explanation of shortageof judges remains valid but is no longersufficient. Against the Law Commission's 1987 recommendation of 50 judges per millionpopulation, India's ratio remains around 22per million. Former Supreme Court judgeJustice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, in a recent interview and his memoir Without Fear or Favour, has highlighted the shortcomings in thejudicial appointments process, includingdelays that can deter capable lawyers from accepting judgeships. This reinforces the need to address not merely the number of vacancies, but also the institutional processes through which judicial capacity is built and sustained. Yet even filling vacancies will not, by itself, resolve the backlog. Equally important is how judicial strength is deployed, cases distributed and appellate work moves through the system. The most visible distortion is the appellate burden. Subordinate courts generate the bulk of litigation, but appeals move upwards, crowding high courts and eventually the apex court. The Court, constitutionally empowered to resolve substantial questions of law and constitutional importance, risks spending disproportionate time correcting errors in individual cases. Constitutional adjudication is consequently crowded out by routine appellate work. Addressing this requires more than procedural tweaks. A radical restructuring of the judiciary is imperative, combining an infusion of manpower with strategic decentralisation of appellate jurisdiction. At the first level, judicial capacity must expand substantially in line with caseloads. Without strengthening the base, no reform at higher levels will be sustained. But expansion alone will not suffice. Designated appellate judges should serve individual subdivisions or clusters, depending on caseload, hearing appeals arising from their jurisdictions. This would allow other judicial officers to concentrate on original adjudication. Similarly, high court benches should bemore widely distributed beyond state capitals, serving district clusters according to caseload and accessibility. They would hear locallyallocated appeals, bringing appellate justice closer to litigants while reducing pressure on capital-based benches. The logic must extend upward. A calibrated decentralisation of the apex court deserves serious consideration. Limited benches of Supreme Court judges could sit at regional centres, distributing appellate work geographically and improving access. The apex court in the Capital can then devote a greater share of its time to constitutional questions, inter-governmental disputes and matters of national importance. This would not dilute its authority but strengthen its constitutional role. Its original jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 131 must remain intact, as must the high courts' writ and original jurisdiction. Safeguards would be necessary to maintain consistency in constitutional interpretation. The same logic should applyto appellate tribunals. Regional benches of tribunals such as NCLAT, CESTAT and CAT already exist,but their geographical reach, staffing and allocation of work deserve review. Adequately staffed benches witheffective territorial coverage could bring specialised adjudication closerto litigants and reduce delay. Thismust respect statutory appellate routes and the high courts' constitutionally protected power of judicial review. Such a model is not without precedent. Variations of decentralised adjudication exist in the US circuit system, Germany's specialised courts and France's appellate structure. India's scale and diversity demand a tailored approach. Article 130 of the Constitution already empowers the CJI, with the President's approval, to appoint places outside Delhi where the Supreme Court may sit. The question is whether this constitutional flexibility should now be meaningfully exercised. Structural reform must, however, be complemented by procedural discipline. First, the Supreme Court must exercise stricter control over its docket. Admission thresholds need to be applied rigorously. Not every High Court pronouncement warrants correction. Otherwise, decentralisation may merely redistribute backlog rather than reduce it. Second, adjournment culture must be addressed decisively. Stricter enforcement of limits on adjournments, coupled with meaningful costs, is essential. Passovers, absent genuine exigency, should become rare. Third, government litigation must be rationalised. With the State accounting for a significant share of pending cases, pre-litigation scrutiny and accountability for unnecessary appeals could reduce inflow. Last, but not least, judicial time must be prioritised. Commercial disputes, criminal trials and constitutional matters require differentiated procedural tracks. Cases involving personal liberty demand particular urgency. Digitalisation and virtual hearings can improve access and efficiency, and technology can help prioritise cases where delay may cause irreversible prejudice. But it cannot substitute for institutional redesign. Without rethinking how cases flow, are listed, heard and decided, additional capacity may struggle to keep pace with a growing backlog. India stands at a judicial inflection point.The task is to redesign the system thatperpetuates backlog....