India, Oct. 30 -- Recent debates around the working and functioning of the Election Commission of India (ECI) have once again stirred a debate around the role of autonomous bodies as elements of constitutional governance. Often, however, this debate suffers from a lack of clarity as its terms are loosely defined. The modern regulatory and administrative State performs a vast range of functions, which are carried out through a number of bodies. Some of these are of a specialised and technical nature, such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Others, such as the ECI - the subject of ongoing controversy - have the task of actualising democratic processes. And then there are bodies that fit uneasily between these two kinds, such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The relationship that these bodies have to the elected government - or the political executive - remains the primary subject of debate.Consider, for example, RBI. Thestatus of RBI came under sharp scrutiny during the demonetisation exercise of 2016. The centralbank was accused of havingrubber-stamped the government's decision to demonetise thecurrency without any independent application of mind. Underlying this argument,however, was the assumption thata country's central bank should -in some sense - be independentof the government when it comesto questions of policy within itsregulatory remit. As scholars such as Canadian historian Quinn Slobodian note, the independence of central banks has long been an essential element of modern neoliberal dogma, according to which certain decisions about the economy should be insulated and separated from democratic contestation. While this argumentis treated as self-evident,it is by no means clear that itis indeed self-evident, as it rests upon what is often argued to bean artificial separation betweenthe economic and the political. At the same time, however, directexecutive control over the central bank appears to throw up problems of its own, especially in a politysuch as India's, where Parliament has long been subordinated to the political executive. This dilemma was evident inthe judgment of the Supreme Court that - six years after the fact - upheld demonetisation. The Court went back and forth on centralbank independence, claiming to endorse it as a principle, but simultaneously undermining it by also endorsing a vague doctrine ofconsultation between the central bank and the government. This led to an incoherent approach, which this author has previously called Schrodinger's independence. The dissenting opinion of Justice Nagarathna was, at least, consistent in endorsing the principle of independence, and then applying it to the facts to hold that independence had been violated. The story of demonetisation and RBI suggests that the starting point of the debate needs to be about the relationship between a so-called autonomous body and the larger democratic context in which it operates, which - in turn - should inform the nature, scope, and degree of "autonomy" that the body should enjoy. If we think, for example, that decisions about the economy are not merely technocratic in nature,but should be subject to democratic oversight, then the central bank ought not to be made independent of representative organs, but - in some way - accountable tothe larger polity. What formthis accountability may take is adifferent question. Similarly, when we think ofECI, there are calls to turn the body into a purely technocratic commission, shorn of political commission. This would make sense if wethink of elections purely as matters of administration. However, if we think of elections as expressions of democratic will, then the body should also be structured in a way that renders it impartial but accountable (for reasons cited here, the simple remedy of having its actions scrutinised by Parliament would not suffice). So, this may take the form, for example, of a multi-partisan structure instead of a non-partisan one, where all major contesting parties have an equal say in how the commission is appointed (a model followed in several countries). The point about citing theexamples of RBI and ECI is towarn that the rhetoric of autonomy and independence can easilyslip into a call for technocraticbodies where all that matters is instrumental expertise. In other words, what is neededis a form of functioning that isfree of executive control, but nonetheless answerable and responsive to democratic oversight. Models of independence and accountability, therefore, must take these principles into account, and steer between the Scylla of executive dominance and the Charybdis of an autonomy that ossifies into an end in itself, rather than as a means to deepening democracy....