New Delhi, April 22 -- The Supreme Court on Tuesday sharpened its scrutiny of the limits of religious autonomy, asking whether the Constitution can remain a silent spectator if a devout believer is barred from approaching or touching a deity solely on account of birth or lineage, as it heard the reference arising out of the Sabarimala temple entry review. Raising fundamental questions on the interplay between faith, equality and constitutional guarantees, a nine-judge constitution bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant repeatedly returned to a central concern : when practices rooted in faith impose permanent disabilities on believers, does the Constitution step in to correct the imbalance, or must courts defer entirely to denominational autonomy? The bench also included justices BV Nagarathna, MM Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, AG Masih, R Mahadevan, Prasanna B Varale and Joymalya Bagchi, The line of inquiry emerged during submissions by senior advocate V Giri, appearing for the Thanthri (chief priest) of the Kerala's Sabarimala temple, who argued that the right to worship under Article 25 is not absolute but must align with the essential characteristics of the deity and the manner in which the temple is consecrated and maintained. According to Giri, a believer cannot simultaneously claim devotion to a deity and challenge the foundational practices governing that deity's worship. But the bench appeared unwilling to accept that formulation without testing it against broader constitutional principles. Justice Amanullah articulated the court's concern, posing a hypothetical situation of a devout believer being denied access to the deity on grounds of birth identity - a condition beyond the individual's control and incapable of change. "I go to a temple, my fundamental belief is that he is the Lord, he is my creator. He has created me, right? I am totally devoted. But there, I am told that, because of your birth or your lineage, for certain restrictions, you are not allowed to touch the deity...permanently. Will the Constitution not come to the rescue? The argument is there can't be a difference between the creator and his creation," added Justice Amanullah. The question, he suggested, was whether such a "permanent disqualification" could withstand constitutional scrutiny. If a person's faith is genuine and deeply held, can the law countenance a situation where the "creation is barred from touching the creator" solely because of birth? The Constitution, the judge implied, may not permit such an absolute exclusion. Responding, Giri conceded that if exclusion is based purely on birth, it would be "wrong and invalid," opening a narrow but crucial window for constitutional intervention even within the domain of religious practices. The bench also explored whether internal dissent within a religious denomination can invite judicial review. Justice Bagchi questioned whether a believer, who remains part of the faith but disputes a particular practice as lacking antiquity or doctrinal basis, is entitled to approach the court. If such challenges are foreclosed, the judge indicated, it may stifle the possibility of reform from within. Giri, however, maintained that a person who fundamentally disagrees with a temple's practices cannot insist on entering that temple to question them. In his formulation, the right under Article 25 protects adherence to faith, not dissent against its core practices within institutional spaces of worship. Justice Sundresh appeared to partly endorse this concern, observing that courts may face difficulty adjudicating claims brought by a solitary dissenter against the collective belief of a denomination. The tension, he suggested, lies in balancing individual assertions with the rights of the larger religious group protected under Articles 25 and 26. Yet, the bench's questions indicated that such deference may not be absolute. Justice Varale underscored the evolving nature of belief, noting that a modern believer may legitimately question longstanding practices. To deny that possibility, he suggested, would be to freeze faith in time and deny its organic development. Justice Nagarathna added another dimension, reiterating that while a believer may not ordinarily question the rationality of faith, non-believers cannot claim a right to intervene in matters of belief. The court, therefore, must navigate a careful path, respecting faith while ensuring that constitutional guarantees are not rendered illusory. The debate on the sixth day of the reference hearing also touched upon the role of judicial review where the State steps in to recognise or regulate religious practices. Responding to arguments that codification of a practice shields it from scrutiny, CJI Kant observed that once the State acts, its decisions are subject to constitutional review. "If the State in the name of social welfare prohibits a religious practice, who will examine it?" asked the CJI. "The power of judicial review: There is no need to attack on that power so much. We understand limitations are there but to say there is no power at all, it may also be very difficult as a proposition," Justice Kant added. At the centre of the debate is the interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, while also protecting the autonomy of religious denominations to manage their own affairs. The nine-judge bench is tasked with answering seven foundational questions arising from the 2019 reference, including the contours of essential religious practices, the balance between individual rights and denominational autonomy, and the limits of judicial review in matters of faith....