New Delhi, Nov. 16 -- The article "Error of Judgment", published in Frontline on November 11, 2026, raises important questions about the Supreme Court's landmark 2006 judgment in Prakash Singh v. Union of India, arguing that it undermined democratic accountability, weakened federalism and complicated the pursuit of meaningful police reform. While these concerns merit serious examination, the critique appears to overlook a more fundamental question: why did judicial intervention become necessary in the first place? The judgment cannot be assessed in isolation from decades of governmental inaction, institutional resistance and the persistent failure to address the structural weaknesses of Indian policing. To question the Court's intervention without adequately examining the circumstances that compelled it risks mistaking the consequence of institutional failure for its cause.

The Prakash Singh judgment was not delivered in a constitutional vacuum. It came after decades of recommendations by expert committees and commissions, beginning with the National Police Commission, which had repeatedly highlighted the politicisation of the police, arbitrary transfers and postings, lack of professional autonomy and inadequate accountability mechanisms. Successive governments had examined these recommendations but failed to translate them into meaningful reforms.

It was this persistent executive inaction that eventually brought the matter before the Supreme Court. Was the Court expected to remain a silent spectator while an essential institution of democratic governance continued to function within an outdated colonial framework?

The judgment's seven directives were not an attempt by the judiciary to administer police forces. They sought to create institutional safeguards: transparent selection of police chiefs, reasonable tenure for operational officers, State Security Commissions, Police Establishment Boards, separation of investigation from law and order, and independent Police Complaints Authorities.

These were structural reforms, not instructions on how the police should conduct individual investigations or maintain law and order.

The argument that the judgment undermined democratic accountability also needs closer scrutiny. There is a fundamental difference between democratic control and political interference. An elected government has every legitimate right to determine policing priorities, formulate policies and hold the police accountable for its performance. But that cannot extend to influencing individual investigations, manipulating transfers and postings or using the police for partisan political purposes.

A police force must be accountable to the Constitution, the law and the citizens. It cannot be reduced to an instrument of the political executive of the day.

Nor should federalism be interpreted as a constitutional licence for administrative inaction. Police is indeed a State subject, and the federal distribution of powers must be respected. But the protection of fundamental rights, equality before law and the rule of law are constitutional obligations that bind every government. Judicial review is an essential safeguard when these obligations are compromised.

Having served in different capacities in state police forces and central armed police organisations, and having headed the Uttar Pradesh Police as DGP, I would argue that institutional reform cannot be achieved merely by changing laws or issuing government orders. It requires leadership, political will, professional commitment and a willingness to change entrenched practices.

My own experience in Uttar Pradesh reinforced this belief. The introduction of the Police Commissionerate system in Lucknow and Noida in 2020 was the outcome of sustained institutional advocacy and the recognition that an expanding urban society required a more responsive and professionally empowered policing structure. It required the political executive to take a decision and the police leadership to demonstrate institutional readiness. Neither could have succeeded in isolation.

This illustrates a larger point: meaningful police reform requires the judiciary, legislature, political executive and professional police leadership to perform their respective constitutional and institutional responsibilities.

I would, however, agree that judicial supervision cannot become an indefinite substitute for legislation or executive action. Courts must respect institutional boundaries, and governments must retain their legitimate authority over policing. But the answer to excessive judicial intervention, wherever it occurs, is not to discredit the original judgment. It is to ensure that governments finally assume responsibility for completing the reform process through appropriate legislation and effective institutions.

Twenty years after the judgment, our more pressing concern should be why its fundamental objectives remain incompletely realised. Why do arbitrary transfers and postings continue? Why are independent complaints authorities still weak in many states? Why has professional autonomy remained so elusive? Why have successive governments not demonstrated the political courage to institutionalise reforms?

These are the questions that deserve answers.

The Prakash Singh judgment should be seen neither as a perfect blueprint nor as an encroachment on democratic governance. It was a constitutional intervention intended to correct a longstanding institutional imbalance. Its shortcomings, if any, should be addressed through experience, legislative refinement and better implementation.

Ultimately, police reform is not about making the police independent of government. It is about making the police independent in the discharge of their lawful duties, accountable for their actions and responsive to the citizens they are meant to serve.

The real threat to democratic accountability is not a police force protected from arbitrary political interference. It is a police force that is professionally weak, institutionally compromised and politically pliable.

That is the unfinished agenda of police reform in India.

Views expressed are personal. The writer is former DG CISF and President of Indian Police Foundation

Published by HT Digital Content Services with permission from Millennium Post.