New Delhi, Sept. 13 -- PM Modi's warning at the BRICS Summit against the "weaponisation" of technology and critical minerals deserves attention beyond the diplomatic setting in which it was delivered. The minerals that power electric vehicles, batteries, renewable-energy systems, semiconductors, electronics and advanced defence equipment are rapidly becoming what oil was to the industrial economy: indispensable inputs whose supply can determine a nation's economic and strategic room for manoeuvre. For India, this creates a vulnerability that cannot be addressed merely by securing mines. The more difficult problem lies in the extraordinary concentration of processing and refining capacity in a handful of countries, particularly China. India remains fully dependent on imports for lithium, cobalt and nickel, while its dependence is also substantial for graphite and several other strategic minerals. In rare-earth magnets, essential to electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics and defence systems, dependence on Chinese supplies has been particularly pronounced. China's export restrictions in recent years have demonstrated how quickly control over processing capacity can translate into leverage over manufacturing elsewhere.
India has recognised the danger. The National Critical Mineral Mission, backed by a planned expenditure of '34,300 crore over seven years, seeks to expand exploration, accelerate mining approvals, encourage overseas acquisitions, develop processing facilities, promote recycling and create strategic stockpiles. Its ambition to undertake 1,200 exploration projects, auction 100 blocks and secure at least 50 overseas mining assets by 2030-31 is significant. The '1,500-crore incentive programme for recovering critical minerals from batteries and electronic waste is equally important. But mineral security cannot be measured simply by the number of blocks auctioned or foreign mines acquired. A country may possess access to ore and still remain dependent if another nation controls the technology and industrial capacity required to separate, refine and convert it into usable materials. India's own policy assessments acknowledge vulnerabilities across lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and copper supply chains, making domestic processing the missing middle between mining and manufacturing.
The lesson from energy security is instructive. India spent decades diversifying crude-oil suppliers, building strategic reserves and strengthening refining capacity because dependence on a narrow set of sources was understood as a national risk. Critical minerals now require comparable strategic thinking. India must diversify suppliers through partnerships with resource-rich countries, acquire overseas assets, build domestic refining and separation capabilities, invest in material substitution and recycling, and maintain reserves of minerals whose disruption could halt crucial industries. Private investment will be indispensable, but government must absorb some of the early technological and commercial risk because processing projects are capital-intensive.
The green and digital transitions will not make India less dependent on natural resources; they will merely change which resources matter. Replacing imported oil with technologies dependent on imported lithium, graphite or rare-earth magnets would exchange one strategic vulnerability for another. Mineral security must therefore become a core component of economic, industrial and national-security policy. India cannot control where geology placed every mineral, but it can ensure that no single country controls the industrial chain between the mine and the factory.
Published by HT Digital Content Services with permission from Millennium Post.