New Delhi, Nov. 4 -- India has rewritten its criminal laws. Yet, the institution entrusted with enforcing those laws continues to operate within a policing framework substantially rooted in the colonial Police Act of 1861. This creates a fundamental constitutional mismatch: modern criminal laws administered through an institutional architecture designed for a different era and a different purpose. Those who guard the law must, at times, be guarded by the law. A democratic police cannot remain merely an arm of the executive; it must ultimately be accountable to the Constitution and the citizen.
The journey has been shaped by several commissions and committees, but the emphasised moment came on September 22, 2006, when the Supreme Court delivered its landmark judgment in Prakash Singh v. Union of India.
Acting on a petition filed by former DGPs seeking implementation of the National Police Commission's recommendations, the Court issued seven binding directives intended to secure institutional independence, operational autonomy and insulation from unwarranted political interference.
Among them were State and National Security Commissions, a minimum two-year tenure for key operational officers, separation of investigation from law and order, independent Police Complaints Authorities (PCAs), and Police Establishment Boards (PEBs) for transfers, postings and promotions. Together, these directives represented an attempt to change not merely police procedures, but the relationship between the police, the executive and the citizen.
Two decades, but an unfinished reform
The record of implementation, however, remains uneven. No state has fully implemented all seven directives in letter and spirit. Some states, including Maharashtra, Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, enacted or substantially overhauled their police laws. Others, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal, relied substantially on executive orders.
The Justice Thomas Committee, appointed by the Supreme Court in 2010 to assess implementation, found the progress deeply inadequate. The larger lesson has been uncomfortable: technical compliance is not the same as institutional reform. Laws and rules can be amended, committees constituted and notifications issued, while the underlying levers of executive control remain substantially untouched.
Four critical fault lines
The appointment of acting or in-charge DGPs has been among the most contested issues. The practice enabled states to circumvent, or appear to circumvent, the transparent empanelment process envisaged by the Court. In 2018, the Supreme Court categorically directed that no state should appoint a person as DGP on an acting basis. Yet subsequent litigation, including proceedings involving states such as Bihar and Jharkhand, has demonstrated the continuing sensitivity of the issue.
The Police Complaints Authority has also struggled to fulfil its intended role. While some jurisdictions have established functioning PCAs, several have faced inadequate staffing, investigative limitations and concerns about institutional independence. An authority intended to provide citizens an independent avenue against serious police misconduct must possess both the resources and autonomy necessary to command public confidence.
The separation of investigation from law and order remains perhaps the most operationally significant unfinished reform. Governments have frequently cited manpower and resource constraints. Some states have established specialised crime branches or separated responsibilities at higher administrative levels. Yet at the police-station level-the first point of contact for most complainants-the two functions remain intertwined. Investigating officers continue to be diverted to law-and-order duties, VIP arrangements, emergencies and other responsibilities. This inevitably affects the time, attention and professionalism available for investigation.
Then comes security of tenure. A minimum tenure for operational officers was intended to prevent transfers from becoming instruments of patronage or punishment. Courts have, on several occasions, intervened against premature transfers. But where the Police Establishment Board lacks real institutional authority, discretionary postings can continue to influence police morale, neutrality and professionalism.
Reform must reach the constable
Police reform, however, cannot stop at institutional structures. Democratic policing is equally about the dignity and working conditions of the personnel who deliver it.
Decent pay and allowances, accommodation, transport, weekly rest, timely settlement of dues, humane working conditions and merit-based postings should be treated as professional entitlements, not acts of individual compassion. The constable on the street is the most visible face of the State. His or her dignity directly influences the dignity with which citizens experience policing.
Exhausting work schedules and inadequate living conditions do not merely affect welfare; they can affect morale, efficiency and professional judgment. The protectors of human rights cannot themselves remain vulnerable to avoidable violations of basic rights and dignity.
From executive control to democratic accountability
There are encouraging examples across the country. Technology, community policing, better training and innovative management practices have demonstrated that a different policing culture is possible. But technology cannot substitute for institutional accountability. Nor can isolated examples of good leadership compensate for structural weaknesses.
The deeper issue is accountability for discretionary decisions-at every level, from the sub-inspector and station house officer to senior leadership and, ultimately, the political executive. Police reform is therefore not simply an administrative exercise. It is fundamentally about the distribution and accountability of power.
20 years later, the challenge is to move from compliance on paper to reform in practice.
The new criminal laws provide India with an opportunity to modernise its justice system. But new laws administered through an old policing culture cannot deliver the full promise of reform. The real test will be whether India can finally move from a ruler's police to a people's police-independent enough to uphold the law, accountable enough to respect the citizen, and humane enough to command public trust.
Views expressed are personal. OP Singh is former DGP UP & President, Indian Police Foundation; H Dixit is Advocate, Supreme Court
Published by HT Digital Content Services with permission from Millennium Post.