New Delhi, Dec. 26 -- The relationship between India and Bangladesh stands at its most critical juncture since the 1971 Liberation War. The sudden collapse of the pro-India Awami League government in August 2024 and the subsequent rise of an interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus have disrupted decades of strategic predictability. While the "Sonaali Adhyaay" (Golden Chapter) of the past decade has faded, the future of the two neighbours will be defined by their ability to transition from a regime-centric alliance to a resilient, state-to-state partnership rooted in economic necessity and regional stability.
Anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh has reached unprecedented levels as 2025 comes to a close. While historically present due to trade and border issues, the sentiment has shifted from sporadic political rhetoric to a dominant, often violent, street narrative following the 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina. Protests have intensified following the December 2025 death of youth leader Sharif Osman Hadi, which many in Bangladesh-driven by conspiracy theories-blame on India. Demonstrators have targeted Indian diplomatic missions, including an attack on the Indian Assistant High Commission in Chittagong, leading India to temporarily suspend visa services. Communal tensions have spiked, exemplified by the brutal lynching of a Hindu youth, Dipu Chandra Das, in December 2025, which is increasingly seen as part of an extremist narrative. Anti-India sentiment is being used as a primary tool for political legitimacy ahead of the national elections scheduled for February 2026.
India's refusal to extradite Sheikh Hasina has become a significant point of friction in the relationship between India and Bangladesh. The political shift in Dhaka has empowered Islamist factions such as Jamaat-e-Islami, which hold anti-India views traditionally. Recent reports of attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh have become a major point of diplomatic friction, fueling domestic political pressure in India.
Security cooperation, once the "high point" of the relationship, is currently under stress. India remains concerned that political instability could allow extremist groups to regroup, potentially threatening India's internal security in the Northeast. Instability and extremist rhetoric in Bangladesh can trigger communal friction within India, particularly in West Bengal and Assam.
The primary challenge for the near future is the recalibration of diplomatic ties following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina. For years, India's "Neighbourhood First" policy was heavily anchored in its relationship with the Awami League. The current political transition has introduced significant uncertainty. India has to look at broadening its engagement beyond traditional elites to include youth leaders, civil society, and opposition factions like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is expected to play a major role in the upcoming early 2026 elections.
Bangladesh is India's largest trading partner in South Asia, but this relationship is currently under strain. Key connectivity projects-including trans-shipment facilities, bus/rail links, and energy pipelines-face delays or cancellations due to political instability. Growing hostility has led to the suspension of Indian visa services in Dhaka and the termination of certain trans-shipment agreements, causing significant logistical hurdles for exporters on both sides.
The new interim government in Bangladesh is actively diversifying its foreign policy, moving away from an India-centric approach to strengthen ties with China, Pakistan, and Western nations. A potential "trilateral axis" involving China and Pakistan is a growing concern for New Delhi. Trade has declined since the regime change, with suspended railway services and disrupted land port activities impacting the flow of goods and people-to-people connectivity.
The growing closeness between the new administration in Bangladesh and Pakistan (often referred to as a shift toward a Pakistan-style ideological or military alignment) presents several critical dangers to India's national security and regional stability. A hostile Bangladesh effectively creates a "three-front" security challenge for India, forcing the military to spread resources across the western (Pakistan), northern (China), and now eastern (Bangladesh) frontiers. India's most sensitive geographic point is the Siliguri Corridor (Chicken's Neck), a narrow 22km stretch connecting mainland India to its eight North-eastern states. Closeness with Pakistan and China could lead to the development of military infrastructure in Bangladesh near this corridor.
There are concerns over a military airstrip in Lalmonirhat, which lies dangerously close to the Siliguri corridor and could be used for surveillance or logistics in collaboration with India's adversaries. A Bangladesh aligned more closely with Pakistan and China could grant India's rivals greater access to strategic ports like Chittagong and
Mongla potentially encircles India from the sea. The development of the Pekua submarine base with Chinese assistance remains a major concern for the Indian Navy's dominance in the Bay of Bengal, as it can dock multiple submarines and warships.
Historically, periods of close Bangladesh-Pakistan ties have correlated with increased anti-India activities. There are fears about the return of insurgent groups like the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) using Bangladeshi soil as a base for operations, a practice that was largely curtailed under the previous regime. The increasing presence of Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) in Bangladesh is viewed as a direct threat to India's internal security, potentially facilitating the flow of counterfeit currency, arms, and radicalised elements into Indian border states.
China is already Bangladesh's largest trading partner and a key supplier of military hardware, and its expanding footprint in port and infrastructure projects near the Siliguri Corridor is viewed by India as a significant strategic threat. China has emerged as a key economic and defence partner for Bangladesh, offering infrastructure investments (e.g., the potential Teesta River project) and supplying military hardware. India is concerned about this expanding influence.
To navigate this complex landscape and revitalise ties, India must work out a pragmatic and multi-dimensional approach. India must engage proactively with all political parties, civil society groups, and media in Bangladesh to avoid the perception of favouring one faction. India must initiate transparent and timely discussions on crucial matters like the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty before its 2026 deadline and adopt a basin-wide management approach for other shared rivers. Failure to initiate early negotiations could fuel anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, where water security is a sensitive national issue. The long-stalled Teesta River agreement remains a major irritant, with Bangladesh seeking equitable distribution during lean seasons.
The current situation requires cautious, consistent diplomacy and a focus on mutual interests to prevent the present drift from hardening into a long-term strategic loss for India in the region. Despite political turbulence, economic interdependence remains the strongest anchor for future ties. Bilateral trade was approximately USD 13.46 billion in 2024-25. As Bangladesh prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026, finalising a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India could be vital for preserving trade privileges and boosting exports. Strategic connectivity projects, such as the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline and cross-border rail links (e.g., Akhaura-Agartala), are essential both for India's "Act East" policy and Bangladesh's economic growth.
Summing up, India-Bangladesh relations are at a critical juncture, defined by a balance between deep historical and functional cooperation on one hand, and significant political and strategic tensions on the other. While historical bonds remain significant, they are no longer sufficient to sustain the partnership. For Bangladesh, the challenge lies in balancing its sovereignty and diverse foreign partnerships with the reality that India remains its most indispensable neighbour for regional security and economic prosperity. For India, the path forward involves maintaining strategic neutrality and focusing on people-centric diplomacy, including protecting minority rights and easing visa restrictions. The long-term trajectory is complex, requiring careful diplomatic navigation by India to manage current instability and counter growing external influences in the region.
Views expressed are personal. The writer is a retired Indian diplomat and had previously served as Consul General in New York
Published by HT Digital Content Services with permission from Millennium Post.