India, March 7 -- Almost six years ago, in April 2020, at the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic's global onset, crude oil prices in the US turned negative because buyers were unwilling to lift stock from existing inventories. A widespread global lockdown had killed large parts of energy demand worldwide. Two years later, when the war between Russia and Ukraine broke out, and many European countries imposed sanctions on Russian energy supplies, crude oil jumped above the psychological threshold of $100/barrel. This was a typical supply shock to energy markets. Europe is still reeling from the aftermath of the war inflation that erupted back then. India was relatively cushioned from these energy market disruptions. The exchequer made a windfall when oil prices were depressed during the pandemic by refusing to lower retail prices concurrently. The strategy had merit because revenue sources had dried up, and government spending needed to increase to aid welfare. In 2022, India managed to pivot from West Asian energy markets to Russia, which was willing to offer petroleum at a discounted rate. The latest, and perhaps still brewing, energy shock resulting from the ongoing war in West Asia might not be so easy for India to navigate. With the Strait of Hormuz witnessing an almost complete cessation of oil shipments due to attacks on ships and a huge spike in insurance premiums, the world's biggest oil-gas producing region is on course to decouple from the global economy. India, like most of its Asian peers, is more dependent on West Asian energy supplies. Even at the peak of India's Russian oil purchases - which have fallen significantly, partly due to a lower price premium and partly to secure a trade deal with the US - West Asian energy purchases were significant. While Russia has assured India of higher supplies, and the US announced that India can resume its Russian energy purchases for 30 days (ruling out any countervailing trade measures), there is good reason to believe that the third oil shock in the past six years will be the most difficult for India to navigate. The biggest reason is that this time it's not about the price being higher. It will be very difficult to fill the void left by the supply shock from West Asian oil markets. At stake, therefore, are not just the usual questions of fiscal numbers and inflation, but also maintaining crucial supply lines such as those for fertilisers, which critically depend on gas supplies. So, what is to be done? The philosophical answer to this question is hope for the best (that the war and supply chain disruptions resolve quickly), but prepare for the worst (that things could be bad for months). The contingency plan - one hopes it is actively being discussed and shaped - should accord maximum priority to ensuring that there is no dearth of fertiliser supplies for the coming sowing season, which will start in about three or four months. A food shock will be the worst thing for the country: It will hurt the poor. Given India's population, food shortages can potentially trigger a massive wage-price spiral. The other important things is securing - if need be, in advance and at a premium - alternative energy supplies from various sources, including Russia. There should also be no hesitation to substitute petroleum with domestically available sources, such as coal-fired power (even if it's dirty)and other renewables. Transparency, both inside and outside the government, will be key to achieving these objectives....